Introduction
Advances in transportation and communications technology increase the potential for international migration around the world. As international migration becomes less inhibited by physical or economic constraints and becomes more of a function of legal constraints imposed by states, it becomes an increasingly important issue in politics among states. As such, international migration is an issue area for possible international cooperation within international organizations or through the formation of less formal international regimes, initially defined by John Ruggie as "mutual expectations, rules and regulations, plans, organizational energies and financial commitments, which have been accepted by a group of states." 1 Michael Doyle, whose report 4 was then submitted to former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan.
Under the auspices of the International Labor Organization (ILO), the United Nations has long had conventions on the rights of migrant workers but they are undersubscribed by UN member states, especially by migration destination states. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has expanded beyond its historic role in postwar repatriation of refugees toward a more general mission of migration management and has increased in membership but it is outside of the UN system and has largely been limited to service provision by member states on a project basis. Under the WTO's General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) some 100 member states have made commitments to temporary admission of foreign nationals who provide services but these commitments mostly involve business visitor visas that are generally limited to 90 days and intra-company transfers that range between two and five years and usually involve highlyskilled managers, engineers and professionals. Given the UN's one year threshold for defining international migration, it can be argued that commitments made under GATS provide a set of norms that are liberalizing policies toward migration, however, only that of the highly-skilled and only for "temporary" migration of up to five years in duration.
As policymakers have come to recognize that economic development in many migration origin countries is facilitated by migrant remittances and that destination countries increasingly look to immigrants to care for and financially support aging populations, academics and policy analysts alike have increasingly discussed the possible development of a migration regime at the global level in both positive and negative terms. 5 Nevertheless, existing agreements do not involve significant commitments on the part of a majority of the world's states to accept labor migration. They do not add up to a regime facilitating the international movement of labor 3 similar to the international trade regime based on the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and subsequently the World Trade Organization (WTO), to which cooperation on international migration has often been compared. 6 If we think about international migration as a subset of all movements of people across international borders, the possibilities for cooperation among states expand. In contrast to the UN definition of migration, "global mobility" refers to movements of people across international borders for any length of time or purpose. In addition to the world's estimated 214 million migrants, 7 there are probably billions of border crossings each year by tourists, business people, students and cross-border commuters who travel internationally for stays of less than a year.
One can only guess at the total because many entries of international travelers are not counted or, if they are, are not collected into international statistics. The total number of travelers would also include unauthorized border crossers whose entries are uncounted. As will be discussed in chapter 3 below, the total number of international travelers who pass through official border crossings of all UN member states could be counted but they are not, leaving us with rather incomplete estimates.
Given that contemporary migration often begins as tourism, study or temporary work abroad, global mobility is a more all-inclusive category for understanding the dynamics of international migration and the potential for its regulation by states. Expanding the issue area of consideration from international migration to global mobility also widens the scope of regime analysis to include international cooperation on international travel in general and the activities of the international organizations concerned with it.
A longstanding but somewhat latent international travel regime exists given that states have been cooperating with each other on passports and visa policy for close to a century. Such 4 cooperation enabled international travel, even in times of war and political tension, but has gone largely unnoticed by international relations analysts and migration scholars. The growth of international travel over the past few decades to billions of border crossings per year involved even more international cooperation and its institutionalization within international organizations. Cooperation on international travel may be closely related to cooperation on migration but it is not the same. Often, cooperation on international travel takes place in international organizations and international fora that do not deal with immigration and refugee policies (see Table 1 .1) but may nevertheless have a significant impact on international migration and asylum-seeking. For the most part, cooperation on international travel has historically focused on facilitating cross-border movements of ever larger volumes of tourists and business people, however, the hijackings of the early 1970s and the suicidal/homicidal hijackings of September 11, 2001 brought security considerations to the fore of international cooperation in this issue area. As transnational organized crime and terrorism have raised security concerns within states, they have increasingly turned to international cooperation to secure international travel while maintaining levels of travel flows.
The politics of cooperation on international travel also differ fundamentally from the politics of cooperation on international labor migration and refugees. Major migration destination states may not be very interested in making commitments to multilateral cooperation to facilitate labor migration but these very same states may be inclined to join an international regime that facilitates the arrival of international travelers who do not come to work but rather to spend money on lodging, meals and leisure activities. While there may be no inherent reciprocity between states that send and receive labor migration, international tourism has as a different array of political constituencies that produce different political dynamics with respect to 5 international bargaining among states. Just as international travel is a part of the process of international migration, asylum seeking and refugee resettlement, international cooperation on travel and the politics surrounding that cooperation has significant consequences for migration and asylum.
Moreover, expanding the scope of international cooperation from cooperation on international migration to global mobility may even provide opportunities for linking cooperation on international travel to cooperation on international labor migration. Essentially, the "international regime for orderly migration" proposed by Bimal Ghosh 8 and discussed below by Rudolph (Chapter 10) and Hollifield (Chapter 12) in particular, increased in value to many policymakers who, in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks, viewed the prospect of nonstate actors acquiring and smuggling a nuclear or biological weapon of mass destruction into their country as one of greatest security threats they face. 9 Before September 11 th , the security threats posed by illegal migration and human smuggling were that of "disruptive movements of people" 10 that could provoke immediate border security problems because the scale of such movements or adverse domestic political reactions to perceived governmental "loss of control" of borders. Now security threats may come from small groups, or even individuals, within larger legal and illegal flows of people across international borders. By increasing the share of international migration that is orderly, properly-documented, pre-screened and comes through ports of entry rather than around them, an international migration regime can help border authorities focus their limited resources on travelers and visitors that potentially pose the greatest security risks. Since the legislatures and publics of many major migration destination countries are very interested in maintaining global mobility in terms of business travel and tourism, while 6 at the same time increasing security, cooperation on secure international travel may also serve as a stepping stone toward broader cooperation on international migration in general.
Perhaps the best way of approaching the issue under consideration is to think in terms of a set of interacting global mobility regimes (as outlined in In the balance of this chapter, I will, first, offer explanations for why an international 
The Lack of International Cooperation on Migration
There has not been sufficient cooperation on international labor migration to produce and international migration regime primarily due to the structuring of economic and political
interests. An international migration regime has not formed at the global level for at least three reasons: 1) migration destination states have no reason to join an international regime to facilitate labor migration; 2) there is no inherent reciprocity similar to that of international trade; 3) there 8 is no leadership from major migration destination states. These obstacles defy the best efforts of international organizations, international non-government organizations (INGOs) and migration origin states to promote cooperation and binding international commitments on labor migration.
In contrast, the structure of economic and political interests within many states differs with respect to the international travel of tourists. Hence, obstacles to international cooperation on international migration may not be operative for cooperation on global mobility. workers, who, in turn, are much more politically motivated against immigration than the broad population of consumers who enjoy lower prices for goods and services. Moreover, the broad 9 economic gains from immigration may be negligible in comparison to the non-economic costs of large-scale immigration on a migration destination country's security, society and culture. Such non-economic costs, whether real or just perceived, have domestic political consequences that make a policy of multilateral engagement on migration even more difficult for destination state policymakers to sell to skeptical publics than international free trade agreements.
The second reason for the lack of global cooperation on labor migration is that bargaining between states on labor migration is not inherently conditioned by reciprocity. 18 In order to One potential point of reciprocity would be for migration destination states to agree to international commitments to legal labor migration in exchange for migrant origin states agreeing to stop their nationals from illegally migrating and working abroad. Gilpin 20 and Robert Keohane 21 have argued, the postwar international monetary regime required the "hegemonic stability" provided by the US as a "lender of last resort," and postwar expansions of free trade under the GATT depended upon a US tolerance of "free-riding" by states in Europe and East Asia that took advantage of US market openings to imports, but retained measures to protect their own markets.
(" [Table 2 .
about here]")
The US has the largest migrant population in the world (see Table 2 Similarly, none of the top ten migration destination countries, which collectively host over half of the world's 214 million migrants (see Table 2 however, was carefully worded to refer to "expatriate and contract labour" and "contractual labour mobility" not "migration" and there are no references to any multilateral commitments to
keeping labor markets open to migrants or contract laborers. ), migration is not the "new security issue;" it is increasing global mobility, which is primarily tourism and business travel.
In response to the Sept. 11 th attacks, the US stiffened its border controls by demanding passenger name records of US-bound travelers as well as requiring all non-immigrant visa applicants to be interviewed at US consulates and submit facial and fingerprint biometrics at that As migration destination countries tightened border controls during the 1990s, an increasing percentage of illegal migrants and asylum seekers paid human smugglers for assistance to circumvent border controls or pass through them using fraudulent travel documents.
Moreover, many of those who thought they were simply being smuggled found themselves coerced into forced labor and prostitution. The increase in human smuggling and trafficking was a dark side of the rapid growth of international travel during the 1990s and it called into question measures taken to facilitate international travel and promote development through international tourism, a small percentage of which became international travel undertaken in order to purchase relatively inexpensive sex with women and children who had been trafficked.
In response, policymakers from the major migration destination countries such as US, states have also come to recognize that they could not collectively combat human trafficking, in which individuals are coerced into forced prostitution and forced labor, if they did not also address human smuggling in which individuals simply pay smugglers to illegally cross international borders. States to which migrants were increasingly smuggled and trafficked also acknowledged that they cannot combat human smuggling and trafficking on a unilateral or even bilateral basis due to the fact that human smuggling often involves several transit countries and smugglers and migrants from more than two countries and, therefore, many of these states have embraced international cooperation on the regional and/or global level.
In December 1998, the UN General Assembly initiated an Ad Hoc Committee that was The prospect of terrorists being smuggled into target states was considered as a potential threat in some law enforcement circles but it was not until after the Sept. 31 As intelligence screening and visa security is tightened in order to stop terrorists from entering legally with valid visas, the threat of clandestine entry of terrorists using smuggling organizations will increase and so to will the security imperatives of the international cooperation to combat human smuggling. 
Regime Formation and State Leadership
Given that international travel cooperation stretches back to the League of Nations, one can say that the international travel regime is older than the refugee regime. Nevertheless, the international travel regime has gone unnoticed because it has been rather latent until the recent burst of state activity in using its organization frameworks to bolster travel security. By providing legal instruments for law enforcement cooperation on border controls, the UN Transnational Crime Convention's "Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea
and Air" provides a set of norms and principles that are constitutive of this strengthening international travel regime. By convening regional meetings devoted to facilitating international cooperation to realize the objectives of the protocols against trafficking and smuggling, the IOM is playing a critical role in fostering regime formation, at least on the regional level. By assisting states with voluntary return, the IOM is also helping states border control efforts directed at illegal migration and human smuggling. To the extent that these state efforts and corresponding international cooperation enables states to maintain "control over their borders" Further institutionalization of an international travel regime will most likely require hegemonic stability with a leader that will facilitate standardization of secure travel documents and biometrics, pay the initial development costs of new border control technologies, initiate 22 deployments of new documents and systems, underwrite the institutionalization of international law enforcement cooperation and be willing to extend foreign assistance to states that may wish to participate in such regimes but do not have the requisite border control capabilities. At the same time, the hegemonic leader must maintain international mobility by keeping its own ports of entry open to legitimate travelers and migrants and spending additional resources to ensure that new security requirements and technologies do not significantly slow legitimate travel flows.
If the resulting cooperation on border security significantly impairs the ability of those with a well-founded fear of persecution to get asylum or be protected, the hegemonic leader would also need to spearhead increased cooperation to provide asylum and protection in place.
Given all of the post-Sept. 11 th border security initiatives and transatlantic cooperation described above, it appears that the US government is committed to international leadership on border security, however, it is not clear that the US is properly equipped to do so, or that the President and the US Congress is politically willing to change that. The US has taken a leadership role in standardizing requirements for travel documents and biometrics in ICAO but it has been slow to implement systems that impose new biometric requirements on its own citizens, or even that of its neighbor, Canada. Although the US Congress has passed legislation requiring an automated entry-exit system that collects facial and fingerprint biometrics of foreigners who travel to the US, it has not passed legislation requiring US citizens who leave or enter the country to be enrolled in the system. The Bush administration was reluctant to request funding to fully implement border security measures at US ports of entry, 33 but some officers could be also detailed to broader international cooperation efforts focusing on terrorist travel and document security. Moreover, the European Commission surpassed US diplomacy on the Passenger Name Record issue when it opted for a global approach and led the international community by proposing a framework for cooperation in ICAO. 24 A third alternative would be transatlantic hegemonic leadership. That is, if the US, Canada and the EU could each agree to lead on issues where they are best able and the others follow that lead in turn, one could image a core group of states that push the agenda of international cooperation on global mobility as well as support it though exemplary implementations, financial contributions and political muscle. This scenario may offer the greatest possibility for regime formation but it is also the most diplomatically complex and would require that the domestic constituencies of a relatively large number of states do not resist either of the two steps of such international cooperation. Moreover, such transatlantic agenda setting offers little to those states outside the core group and could prompt significant diplomatic resistance from the rest of the world should transatlantic hegemonic leadership actually take shape.
Volume Chapters
In light of the broadened approach of considering the three interacting regimes (refugees, Organization (WTO) and argues that it is highly unlikely that a comprehensive, highly institutionalized migration regime similar to the WTO will be established anytime soon. He goes on to argue that gradually establishing a myriad of smaller regimes governing different aspects of mobility need not lack coherence if incremental institutionalization is accompanied by depoliticized dialogue. In chapter eleven, Philip Martin points out a dilemma confronting advocates of international cooperation to facilitate migration from developing to industrial countries. Since there are relatively few highly skilled workers, countries seeking them generally admit them with families and often lay out a clear path to settlement. Since there are far more low-skilled migrant workers, many countries restrict their rights to settle. Given that the international migrant rights regime does not make distinctions between high-and low-skilled migrant workers, equality of treatment can lead a trade-off between migrant rights and migrant 28 numbers at the low end of the labor market. With a negatively sloped demand for labor and with equal rights for migrants raising labor costs, more rights can mean a decreased demand for migrant workers. Martin illustrates this dilemma with debates during the WTO's GATS negotiations over whether migrant service providers must be paid minimum or equal wages in the countries in which they work. James Hollifield develops a public goods approach to labor migration in chapter twelve. By considering labor mobility in terms of an international public good, Hollifield sets out to understand how sending and receiving states shape and control labor flows for strategic gains, the relationship between trade and the mobility of labor and capital, the substitutability and complementarity of trade and migration, and how states can overcome free rider problems and externalities to cooperate in the regulation of migration and mobility. In chapter thirteen, Joseph Chamie and Barry Mirkin investigate why the United Nations has convened a variety of global conferences but it has not done so on international migration. 
